EXHIBIT 1

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THOMAS REILLY

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

- - -

THOMAS REILLY : CASE NO.

: 2:17-CV-02045-JCJ

vs.

:

GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC:

- - -

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2018

- - -

VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS

REILLY, taken pursuant to notice, was held at the law offices of Reed Smith LLP, Three Logan Square, 1717 Arch Street, Suite 3100, Philadelphia, PA 19103, commencing at 9:36 a.m., before Kimberly S. Gordon, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public.

- - -

One Penn Center
1617 J.F.K. Boulevard, Suite 340
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
www.elitelsllc.com ~ (215) 563-3703

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1	APPEARANCES:		
2			
3	POLLINS LAW		
4	BY: SCOTT M. POLLINS, ESQUIRE TASHELL J. JENKINS, ESQUIRE		
5	303 W. Lancaster Avenue, Suite 1C Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087		
6	610.896.9909 scott@pollinslaw.com		
7	tashell@pollinslaw.com Representing the Plaintiff		
	vebresemend one transcrip		
8	REED SMITH LLP		
9	BY: BETTY S.W. GRAUMLICH, ESQUIRE ANNE E. ROLLINS, ESQUIRE		
10	Three Logan Square, Suite 3100 1717 Arch Street		
11	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103		
12	804.344.3456 215.851.8221		
13	<pre>bgraumlich@reedsmith.com arollins@reedsmith.com</pre>		
	Representing the Defendant		
14			
15	ALSO PRESENT: DANIEL BURKE, VIDEOGRAPHER		
16	ELIZABETH FEENEY, ESQUIRE		
17			
18			
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5	Testimony of	f: THOMAS REILLY	
6			
7			
8	By Ms. Grau	mlich7	
9	By Mr. Poll:	ins268	
10			
11			
12			
13		EXHIBITS	
14			
15	EXHIBIT NUM	BER DESCRIPTION PAGE MARKED	
16	Reilly-1	Plaintiff0046140-46141 55	
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1	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are now	
2	on the record. My name is Daniel	
3	Burke. I'm a videographer retained	
4	by Elite Litigation Solutions.	
5	This is a video deposition for	
6	the United States District Court,	
7	Eastern District of Pennsylvania.	
8	Today's date is December 11, 2018,	
9	and the video time is 9:36.	
10	This deposition is being held	
11	at 1717 Arch Street, 31st Floor,	
12	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in the	
13	matter of Reilly versus	
14	GlaxoSmithKline, LLC. The deponent	
15	is Thomas Reilly.	
16	All counsel will be noted on	
17	the stenographic record. The court	
18	reporter is Kimberly Gordon and will	
19	now swear-in the witness.	
20		
21	THOMAS REILLY, after having	
22	been duly sworn, was examined and	
23	testified as follows:	
24		

Page 38 1 Q. Why did you leave Safeguard? 2 Α. The company just wasn't strong and it 3 was going through some leadership challenges, 4 and it just -- I just found a better 5 opportunity. Ο. Did you leave voluntarily? 7 Α. Yes. Ο. What was the better opportunity you 9 found? That was at GlaxoSmithKline. 10 Α. When did you join GSK? 11 Q. 12 Α. I believe it was May of 1999, April 13 or May. I believe it was May of 1999. 14 And what was your job title when you 15 started working at GSK? 16 Α. It might have been like an AS/400 17 Analyst or something along those lines.

- 18 be perfectly honest, I do not remember. I
- 19 could find out, but I don't remember the
- 20 exact title.
- 21 Q. Did your -- strike that.
- 22 Does GSK have salary bands for
- 23 management employees?
- 24 A. They have salary bands for all

- 1 Q. So, from the time you were promoted
- 2 to senior consultant until you left, your pay
- 3 band never changed. Is that correct?
- 4 A. The band never changed, right.
- 5 O. And I assume there is levels of
- 6 salaries within a pay band. Is that right?
- 7 A. Yes. Yes.
- 8 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that Jaime
- 9 Burke hired you. Is that right?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Was that the first person you
- 12 reported to at GSK?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. How long did you report to Jaime
- 15 Burke?
- 16 A. He moved into a new position in 2001.
- 17 So it was from 1999 to 2001.
- 18 Q. And after you reported to Jaime
- 19 Burke, who did you report to next?
- 20 A. Brian Gillies, G-I-L-L-I-E-S.
- 21 Q. How long did you report to Brian
- 22 Gillies?
- 23 A. From 2001 until 2012 -- 2001 through
- 24 2011. He left, he moved out right in the

- 1 beginning of 2012.
- Q. And what position did Brian Gillies
- 3 go to when he moved out?
- 4 A. He moved from the AS/400 Service
- 5 Manager to be the leader of Document
- 6 Management.
- 7 Q. Do you know if his management level
- 8 or pay band changed when he went to Document
- 9 Management? In other words, was that a
- 10 lateral position or a promotion?
- 11 A. From a pay scale standpoint, I have
- 12 no insight. I would imagine that he stayed
- 13 at the same sal-, and this is just
- 14 speculation, I don't believe that he changed
- 15 bands. But as far as the job itself, it was
- 16 a serious demotion.
- 17 O. It was a demotion?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Why do you think it was a demotion?
- 20 A. Because there were a lot of problems
- 21 with the service.
- 22 Q. But what do you mean by "service"?
- 23 A. The AS/400 service.
- Q. What were those problems?

- 1 A. Serious security exposures, serious
- 2 performance problems.
- 3 Q. What were the security exposures?
- 4 A. I don't know where to begin. People
- 5 with, users with too much authority. Systems
- 6 not being set up securely.
- 7 Q. Anything else?
- 8 A. Systems not configured correctly.
- 9 People making unauthorized changes to system
- 10 security.
- 11 Q. Anything else?
- 12 A. Servers being built without following
- 13 IT controls and change management and best
- 14 practices. Systems being compromised.
- 15 O. Compromised how?
- 16 A. You have a consultant overseas that
- 17 has too much authority, and somebody in
- 18 Access Management would take their authority
- 19 away. So he'd call his buddy who also had
- 20 too much authority, and they'd just give it
- 21 back to him. There was just -- the IT
- 22 controls had just broken down.
- There's much more than that. But as
- 24 much as I can recall off the top of my head

- 1 to do the technical work and be the technical
- 2 lead.
- 3 Q. Did you say Bally's or GSK?
- 4 A. I'm sorry. GSK. I'm sorry.
- 5 They had a lot of work that needed to
- 6 be done. And Brian has never signed onto an
- 7 AS/400. He's just a manager who got the job
- 8 during the SmithKline Beecham/Glaxo welcome
- 9 merger. He got this job but was not really
- 10 qualified.
- 11 So the understanding was that Brian
- 12 would be the manager of the team but I was
- 13 the technical lead. He depended on me to
- 14 make him successful, and I depended on him to
- 15 make me successful.
- 16 Q. Who did Brian Gillies report to?
- 17 A. In 2003?
- 18 O. Yes.
- 19 A. It was either Steve Miller or John
- 20 Borror. You know, I just want to go on
- 21 record as saying that I can't say for sure.
- 22 Q. What position was John Borror in that
- 23 he was able to promote you?
- 24 A. He eventually became a VP. He might

- 1 have been a director at the time. I believe
- 2 he was at least a director. I've never known
- 3 John to be anything less than a director.
- 4 But he could have been a VP at the
- 5 time. It's just been too long and I just
- 6 can't remember.
- 7 Q. Now, you said the understanding was
- 8 that one day you would be the manager. How
- 9 did you gain that understanding?
- 10 A. Because I discussed it with John and
- 11 I discussed it with Brian Gillies. I had a
- 12 review with Brian Gillies every year, and I
- 13 always overachieved. And we often talked
- 14 about the day that he retired. Because he
- 15 wanted to retire some day, and he -- we had
- 16 many informal conversations where it was just
- 17 assumed that one day I would be put into that
- 18 position.
- 19 Q. How far away was Brian Gillies from
- 20 retirement when you stopped reporting to him?
- 21 A. I don't know.
- 22 Q. Do you know how much -- strike that.
- 23 Do you know if he was older than you?
- 24 A. I believe so. I don't know how old

- 1 he was, but I believe he was older than me.
- 2 I'm confident that he was, but I couldn't say
- 3 for sure.
- 4 Q. How many conversations did you have
- 5 with John Borror about your eventually taking
- 6 over for Brian Gillies as the manager?
- 7 A. I think it was just that one
- 8 conversation when he called me into his
- 9 office when I had let them know that I was
- 10 going to be leaving the company.
- 11 Q. What was the lucrative opportunity
- 12 that you passed on to stay at GSK?
- 13 A. I do not remember at this point. It
- 14 was a management position, but I could not
- 15 tell you.
- 16 Q. Who did you report to after you
- 17 stopped promoting to -- strike that.
- 18 Who did you report to after you
- 19 stopped reporting to Brian Gillies?
- 20 A. Jo Taylor.
- 21 Q. How long did you report to Jo Taylor?
- 22 A. From the beginning -- from early 2012
- 23 through 2015.
- Q. And were there any times during that

Page 63 them were just like the state of certain things.

- 3 Q. Now, what do you mean when you refer
- 4 to Sarb-Ox compliant?

1

2

- 5 A. In what context?
- 6 Q. In the context you just used it. You
- 7 said you need security reports --
- 8 A. Yes, we had --
- 9 Q. -- to be Sarb-Ox compliant.
- 10 A. No. The system had to be Sarb-Ox
- 11 compliant. One of the controls was to have
- 12 security reports. There were a lot of
- 13 internal controls. And in order to be --
- 14 O. But --
- 15 A. -- Sarb-Ox compliant, we had Sarb-Ox
- 16 audits every once in a while, and we had to
- 17 have security reports so the Access
- 18 Management people could see what was
- 19 happening so that if we had an internal or an
- 20 external audit they'd be ready.
- Q. By "Sarb-Ox", I assume you're
- 22 referring to Sarbanes-Oxley?
- 23 A. Yes.
- Q. Have you ever had any training in the

- 1 -- strike that.
- What training if any have you had on
- 3 Sarbanes-Oxley while you worked at GSK?
- 4 A. I don't know the exact name of the
- 5 training, but I have transcripts of the
- 6 training.
- 7 Q. What do you mean by you have
- 8 transcripts of the training?
- 9 A. Well, I mean we each had a, everybody
- 10 had, you could log onto the online learning
- 11 system and see your transcript of all the
- 12 trainings you've ever had, and a good portion
- of them were Sarbanes-Oxley training.
- 14 Q. Tell me what you remember about the
- 15 Sarbanes-Oxley training that you took at GSK.
- 16 A. I don't remember the actual details,
- 17 but it stressed the importance to the company
- 18 of being Sarbanes-Oxley compliant.
- 0. What does that mean? What was your
- 20 understanding of what that meant?
- 21 A. Sarbanes-Oxley means that you have
- 22 internal controls in place and those internal
- 23 controls are effective and that they're being
- 24 enforced. You have to follow your own

			Page	75
1		with that if it was determined that		
2		something wasn't		
3	BY MS.	GRAUMLICH:		
4	Q.	By "we", you mean the team that all		
5	reported to Brian Gillies?			
6	Α.	Could be our group, yes.		
7	Q.	Now, you testified earlier that you		
8	got along with Brian Gillies until 2010.			
9	What happened in 2010?			
10	Α.	Actually, I want to modify that. It		
11	was 2011.			
12	Q.	So, from 2001 to 2011, you got along		
13	with B	rian and then something happens?		
14	Α.	Yes.		
15	Q.	What happens?		
16	Α.	Rick Oberholzer made a change on the		
17	North A	America Pharmaceutical and Financial		
18	server	against my strong recommendation.		
19	Q.	And what change did Rick Oberholzer		
20	made?			
21	Α.	He enabled something called uncapped		
22	processors.			
23	Q.	What is an uncapped processor?		
24	Α.	A server is generally configured and		

- 1 designed to run at 100 percent CPU
- 2 utilization. All of the other components,
- 3 the memory and the disc arms and everything
- 4 are designed to run at 100 percent. Just
- 5 like a car, let's say the fastest car can go
- 6 is 100 percent. He changed that so that the
- 7 system could run at a couple hundred percent
- 8 CPU. I warned him not to do it. I told him
- 9 not to do it. And he made that change, and
- 10 it brought the system to its knees.
- I built that server. It was
- responsible for between 100 and \$150,000,000
- 13 a day in revenue because it was an order
- 14 management system and it also ran their
- 15 financials and it supported 90 percent of
- 16 North America orders and 60 percent of global
- 17 orders, and it came to its knees. And it
- 18 was, it was a big deal.
- 19 Q. Now, what was the server that he made
- 20 the change on?
- 21 A. North America Pharmaceutical.
- 22 O. And --
- 23 A. It's called -- if you put
- 24 Enterprise 1 next to it, that was something

- 1 else that's known as the Enterprise 1 server.
- 2 Enterprise 1 is the financial application
- 3 that runs on the system.
- 4 Q. What applications ran on the North
- 5 American Pharma server?
- 6 A. Enterprise 1. It hosted --
- 7 Enterprise 1 could run financials and it
- 8 could run order management.
- 9 Q. Anything else?
- 10 A. It was designed to run in conjunction
- 11 with some servers that did financial
- 12 reporting.
- 13 Q. Did the Enterprise 1 have anything to
- 14 do with the actual manufacture of
- 15 pharmaceuticals?
- 16 A. I'm not sure I understand your
- 17 question.
- 18 Q. Did the North American Pharma server,
- 19 was it second to any manufacturing
- 20 operations?
- 21 A. No. It was a stand-alone financial
- 22 server that I had built. They migrated from
- 23 an expensive mainframe application. I built
- 24 that server for them, delivered it, tuned it,

- 1 turned it over to them, and it was running
- 2 perfectly.
- 3 Q. Why did Rick Oberholzer make the
- 4 change to an uncapped processing?
- 5 A. Because he could. I don't have a
- 6 good answer for that. He --
- 7 Q. Did he ever tell anyone, either to
- 8 you or that you heard, what he thought the
- 9 benefits of moving to an uncapped processor
- 10 were?
- 11 A. I guess he thought that if the server
- 12 ran at 300 percent or 400 percent instead of
- 13 100 percent, in his head, he thought it would
- 14 be a good thing, but it's like the equivalent
- of driving your car on the highway 400 miles
- 16 an hour.
- 17 Q. Is uncapped processing, is that an
- 18 available feature of the IBM iSeries, AS/400
- 19 iSeries?
- 20 A. The iSeries hardware can run the
- 21 operating system OS/400, and it can run
- 22 another operating system called AIX. As an
- 23 analogy, let's say your laptop could run
- 24 Windows or macOS. It's the same thing. It

- 1 could run two different operating systems.
- 2 The hardware you could enable
- 3 uncapped processors and it was supported in
- 4 AIX, but it was not supported for OS/400,
- 5 which was the operating system we ran. So
- 6 you could turn it on, but it was not supposed
- 7 to be turned on for OS/400.
- 8 Q. It was not supposed to be turned on
- 9 for what?
- 10 A. OS/400, the operating system that we
- 11 were running. The hardware could run two
- 12 different operating systems.
- 13 Q. And the other one was AIX?
- 14 A. AIX, yes.
- 15 Q. And were any servers at GSK running
- 16 ATX?
- 17 A. There's an entirely different
- 18 platform that they're trying to move all the
- 19 AS/400s to. They've been trying to move to
- 20 it for 15 years. It's called the ERP system,
- 21 and I believe that runs AIX.
- But I'm not, I'm not privy, other
- 23 than knowing it has serious problems, I'm not
- 24 privy as to whether they're running that

- 1 feature or not.
- Q. Doesn't uncapped processing allow the
- 3 server to use capacity from another server if
- 4 that capacity is available? You have to
- 5 answer for the court reporter, please.
- 6 A. Yes, it does. It allows you to use
- 7 CPU capacity.
- 8 Q. And so why do you say that it was
- 9 running this server at more than 100 percent
- 10 if the uncapped would allow CPU to be used
- 11 for a different server?
- 12 A. Because there's also memory and disc
- 13 arms that have to keep up with it. The
- 14 memory and disc arms could keep up with
- 15 100 percent. The memory and the disc arms
- 16 could not keep up with 800 percent. It would
- 17 just thrash. The memory would thrash. The
- 18 disc arms would thrash. Everything would
- 19 just -- it would just basically lock up and
- 20 seize up.
- 21 Q. If you added memory, would that
- 22 resolve the problem?
- 23 A. That's why it's not supported on
- 24 OS/400. Because on other platforms, my

- 1 understanding is on other platforms you can
- 2 also give the system memory, not just CPU.
- 3 And that was the limitation of OS/400 that it
- 4 would give you more CPU but it would not give
- 5 you more memory.
- 6 Q. So there's no way to add more memory
- 7 to the OS/400?
- 8 A. You could add more memory, sure.
- 9 Q. So, if you added more memory to the
- 10 OS/400, would that resolve the problem you
- 11 just described caused by uncapping it?
- 12 A. Not necessarily.
- 13 O. But could it?
- 14 A. You could try to remediate it. I
- 15 believe that's what Oberholzer did. I think
- 16 they spent -- after he turned this on,
- 17 instead of disabling it after the system
- 18 seized up, he went and lobbied for the
- 19 purchase of about three or \$400,000 worth of,
- 20 a good part of it was memory I believe to
- 21 kind of compensate. He could have just
- 22 turned it off, but instead, it turned into a
- 23 new purchase that was unnecessary.
- 24 Because the system was running okay

- 1 before he did it. All he had to do once the
- 2 system seized up was to turn it off. But he
- 3 chose to instead lobby the company to spend
- 4 three or \$400,000 on additional memory, and
- 5 that did not fix the problem either.
- 6 O. So -- now, Mr. Oberholzer was a level
- 7 below you, correct?
- 8 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes?
- 9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
- 10 BY MS. GRAUMLICH:
- 11 Q. So did he have the authority to do
- 12 this on his own?
- 13 A. Gillies didn't stop him. I told
- 14 Gillies that it was a bad idea. I told
- 15 Oberholzer it was a bad idea. As the
- 16 technical lead who had performance tuned all
- 17 the systems and built the systems, my advice
- 18 should have been taken, but in the end,
- 19 Gillies allowed him to do it.
- 20 Q. Now, you testified that this change
- 21 on the Pharma server, the Enterprise 1
- 22 brought the system to its knees. What did
- 23 you mean by that?
- 24 A. We have users all around the world

- 1 whose workstations just locked up. The
- 2 people who supported the application in
- 3 Philadelphia called us telling us they
- 4 couldn't do business; they couldn't take
- 5 orders; data was getting corrupted; there was
- 6 going to be delays in financial reports.
- 7 Q. What data was corrupted?
- 8 A. Orders were being lost. Orders were
- 9 being corrupted.
- 10 Q. Do you know that they were lost or
- 11 that the server simply wouldn't operate?
- 12 A. It was a combination of everything.
- 13 The orders that were placed either got
- 14 contaminated or the person who made the order
- 15 hit "enter", and then when the system came
- 16 back after it was down, they said it was no
- 17 longer there. I guess they had to re- --
- 18 they had to re-enter the order I guess.
- 19 But my understanding was that orders
- 20 were being lost. And these are orders from
- 21 like Walmarts where it's not just like a \$30
- 22 order. It's like they could spend tens of
- 23 millions of dollars in a day. It was big
- 24 numbers, and they couldn't do business.

- 1 Q. How long was the server locked up?
- 2 A. It continued to happen for weeks
- 3 until they got this emergency hardware
- 4 upgrade. The first instance I don't know
- 5 exactly how long it locked up, but I was
- 6 getting calls from senior people in
- 7 Philadelphia telling me that they had a
- 8 serious problem. And I was trying to work
- 9 through remediating their problem. I knew
- 10 what caused it, and I was trying to work
- 11 through fixing it.
- 12 But the exact amount of time that it
- 13 locked up, I don't know. But I know that it
- 14 continued to run in a compromised state for a
- 15 while until they went and purchased new
- 16 hardware when they could have just turned it
- 17 off. That was the key, they could have just
- 18 disabled what he had done, but that wasn't
- 19 going to happen.
- 20 O. And --
- 21 A. But I was helpless to do anything
- 22 about it.
- Q. When the company purchased emergency
- 24 hardware, as you described it, did that fix

- 1 the problem?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. What happened after that?
- 4 A. The problem just wasn't as bad, but
- 5 it never fixed it.
- 6 Q. Now, you testified that your
- 7 relationship was not the same with Brian
- 8 Gillies after this. What happened between
- 9 you and Mr. Gillies?
- 10 A. He was on vacation when this got
- 11 enabled, uncapped processors. And when the
- 12 phone started ringing and people started
- 13 panicking and they told me the level of the
- 14 issues that they were having, I walked over
- 15 to Rick Oberholzer's desk, and he started
- 16 screaming at me.
- I tried to explain to him that I knew
- 18 what the problem was and we needed to turn it
- 19 off, and he just went off on me in an open
- 20 office area and just started screaming at me.
- 21 And he had a hist- --
- 22 O. Who else was there?
- 23 A. Dan Mong was there. Robert Mattie
- 24 was there. It was an open office. Everybody

- 1 Q. And were you able to get anybody to
- 2 work with you?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Why not?
- 5 A. Oberholzer was not going to work with
- 6 me because he was apoplectic. He was hostile
- 7 and angry, and --
- 8 Q. Why was Rick Oberholzer hostile
- 9 towards you?
- 10 A. Rick Oberholzer was hostile towards
- 11 everybody at the data center for over a
- 12 decade. That just was his personality. He
- 13 was extremely, extremely hostile.
- 14 Q. So how did this affect your
- 15 relationship with Brian Gillies?
- 16 A. I was trying to work the problem
- 17 because of what was at stake with the North
- 18 America Financial server. I mean, besides
- 19 the financials, the order management was a
- 20 mess. When Brian Gillies came back from
- 21 vacation, he called me into a back office and
- 22 told me that Robert Mattie had called his
- 23 boss in the UK the previous week saying that
- 24 I had started an incident with Rick

- 1 Oberholzer.
- 2 Gillies was afraid of Mattie. Mattie
- 3 never told me he called the director. Mattie
- 4 should have known I was left in charge.
- 5 Mattie knew that Oberholzer was hostile and
- 6 unreasonable but he just secretly called my
- 7 manager's boss in the UK, and a week went by
- 8 before I found out.
- 9 Q. So how did that affect you?
- 10 A. Gillies was not happy that Mattie had
- 11 called his boss, and he told me my career was
- 12 effectively over.
- 13 O. And when Brian Gillies was taken out
- of that manager role, was that the reason why
- 15 you didn't get the job?
- 16 A. Yes. My career was irreparably
- 17 damaged after -- after Mattie escalated on
- 18 me, my career was irreparably damaged, yes.
- 19 Q. So you knew at the end of 2011, after
- 20 Robert Mattie called Brian Gillies' boss in
- 21 the UK, that your career at GSK was
- 22 irreparably damaged?
- 23 A. That's what he told me.
- Q. Do you have any reason not to believe

- 1 him?
- 2 A. The only reason that I had to not
- 3 believe it was I believed that I had such a
- 4 productive career there over so many years
- 5 that it would take more than one person,
- 6 especially Gillies, to tell me that my career
- 7 was over. I had achieved a lot globally
- 8 within the company.
- 9 So, when Gillies said it, I believed
- 10 that that's what he thought in his head, but
- 11 -- and he was -- it was very personal for him
- 12 because his boss had got called while he was
- 13 on vacation. I think he was taking it
- 14 personally. That was his words. I didn't
- 15 necessarily believe that that was the case.
- 16 Because you don't get judged, especially when
- 17 it's not your fault. I mean everybody knew
- 18 that Oberholzer was hostile. He cursed
- 19 people out for over a decade, including
- 20 Mattie. And it was a shock even to
- 21 Oberholzer that Mattie escalated.
- But to answer your question, no, I
- 23 thought that the body of my work over a
- 24 decade and what I had done for the company

- 1 was bigger than Brian Gillies' feelings being
- 2 hurt and telling me that my career was
- 3 damaged.
- 4 O. When Brian Gillies went to Document
- 5 Management, were you named as the manager?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. So you were not promoted at that
- 8 time, correct?
- 9 A. It all happened behind the scenes.
- 10 There was no advertisement for the job. We
- 11 got called into a meeting and were told this
- 12 announcement that they had swapped roles.
- Q. And are management positions, were --
- 14 strike that.
- Were management positions at GSK
- 16 changed without posting the job?
- 17 A. In this case, it was.
- 18 Q. Was there any requirement that a
- 19 management position had to be posted to be
- 20 filled?
- 21 A. I don't know.
- 22 O. You don't know?
- 23 A. Usually, if somebody left a position,
- 24 people applied for it.

- 1 A. I had it in my 401(k). And I would
- 2 get stock grants each year when I was at GSK,
- 3 stock grants and stock options.
- 4 Q. And when did you sell or dispose of
- 5 your stock?
- 6 A. When I moved my 401(k) into an IRA
- 7 after I left GSK. And over the last three
- 8 years, I've been cashing it in just to make
- 9 up for lost salary, and now I have none. I
- 10 no longer have any GSK stock.
- 11 Q. Do you have any experience drafting
- 12 or reviewing financial statements?
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. Do you have any experience with
- 15 accounting documents, balance sheets,
- 16 financials?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Do you have any experience with
- 19 securities filings?
- 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. What is your lay understanding of
- 22 what constitutes a violation of
- 23 Sarbanes-Oxley?
- 24 A. Breakdown of internal controls.

- 1 Q. Anything else?
- 2 A. When data gets corrupted, when
- 3 systems are not secured, when information is
- 4 withheld from auditors purposely, when
- 5 serious issues are not disclosed to the
- 6 public.
- 7 Q. What do you mean by "serious issues"?
- 8 A. GSK's computer fleet is not secure.
- 9 There's a breakdown of internal controls, and
- 10 the company never discloses it in their
- 11 filings.
- 12 Q. Have you ever reviewed the
- 13 Sarbanes-Oxley or SEC filings of other public
- 14 companies other than GSK?
- 15 A. The only other one I've ever looked
- 16 at is Novartis.
- 17 Q. And when did you look at Novartis'
- 18 public filings?
- 19 A. Maybe in the last two years ago,
- 20 maybe in the last year.
- 21 Q. Why?
- 22 A. Well, because GSK and Novartis did
- 23 some transactions where I believe they
- 24 swapped assets, and I know that GSK brought a

- 1 corrupted. Under what circumstances do you
- 2 think it's a SOX violation if data is
- 3 corrupted?
- 4 A. If it's financial data --
- 5 Q. So --
- 6 A. -- and you can't get to it, it could
- 7 impact the financial report. The financial
- 8 transactions are lost.
- 9 Q. So is it a Sarbanes-Oxley if data --
- 10 strike that.
- 11 Do you believe it is a Sarbanes-Oxley
- 12 violation if data is, if financial data is
- 13 corrupted and then corrected?
- 14 A. I don't know. I never thought of
- 15 that.
- 16 Q. So is it your testimony that anytime
- 17 that something goes wrong with a computer and
- 18 any kind of data is corrupted that that would
- 19 be a Sarbanes-Oxley violation?
- 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. So is it only if financial data is
- 22 corrupted that you believe it's a
- 23 Sarbanes-Oxley violation?
- 24 A. Well, I think from what I understand

- 1 from the 20-F and the disclosures you have to
- 2 disclose deficiencies in your internal
- 3 controls not just from financial systems but
- 4 manufacturing systems. If your manufacturing
- 5 systems are unstable, it could impact your
- 6 profitability.
- 7 So it's not just financial reporting.
- 8 I believe that you're supposed to disclose
- 9 deficiencies just because it could have an
- 10 affect on your overall operation, my
- 11 understanding.
- 12 Q. The things that you have listed thus
- 13 far in your deposition as a SOX violation,
- 14 breakdown of internal controls, when data
- 15 gets corrupted, and you said something about
- 16 systems. I missed that. Do you remember
- 17 what that was?
- 18 A. No.
- MS. GRAUMLICH: Would you mind
- 20 looking back real quick?
- 21 BY MS. GRAUMLICH:
- 22 O. Sometimes are not secure. Is that
- 23 one of the things you think is a
- 24 Sarbanes-Oxley violation when a system is not

- 1 secure?
- 2 A. When a system is not secure, it's not
- 3 necessarily a Sarbanes violation if you make
- 4 a good effort to fix it. When you withhold
- 5 the information from people, I believe that
- 6 that's a Sarbanes-Oxley when you withhold it
- 7 from your internal auditor, when you withhold
- 8 it from the business, when you withhold it
- 9 from Quality Risk Assurance.
- 10 Yes, I mean things happen. There's
- 11 always something in place to fix something
- 12 that's broken, but if the problem is caused
- 13 by a deficiency in an IT control, that's a
- 14 Sarb-Ox issue. But I'm not sure if I
- 15 answered your question.
- 16 O. Do internal controls break down?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 O. Deficiencies and internal controls
- 19 happen, right?
- 20 A. Do internal controls break down?
- 21 Sure, yes.
- 22 Q. And if a company fixes the deficiency
- 23 and the internal controls, do you believe
- 24 that's still a Sarbanes-Oxley violation?

- 1 Q. Is there anything that you believe
- 2 GSK did that constituted securities fraud?
- 3 A. I would say not disclosing serious
- 4 breakdowns in internal controls in their
- 5 Form 20-F.
- 6 Q. And what is your understanding of
- 7 what a public company is required to report
- 8 about its internal controls on a 20-F?
- 9 A. They're supposed to vouch for the
- 10 effectiveness of their internal controls.
- 11 Q. Now, how do you -- strike that.
- 12 How did you gain your understanding
- 13 that a company is supposed to vouch for their
- 14 internal controls on their Form 20-F?
- 15 A. I can't recall why I know that, when
- 16 I knew that. It's just something that I
- 17 know. I don't --
- 18 Q. And do you know that for a fact or
- 19 that's simply your belief or understanding?
- 20 A. That's my understanding.
- 21 Q. Is there anything else that you
- 22 believe GSK did that constituted securities
- 23 fraud?
- 24 A. Well, I think the lengths they went

- 1 to retaliate against me and withhold the
- 2 information and then try to marginalize and
- 3 damage control, I think the effort that they
- 4 made to keep it secret.
- 5 Q. Why do you believe that efforts to
- 6 retaliate against you constitute securities
- 7 fraud?
- 8 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry.
- 9 I didn't understand one of the words.
- 10 BY MS. GRAUMLICH:
- 11 Q. Why do you believe that efforts to
- 12 retaliate against you constitute securities
- 13 fraud?
- 14 A. Because they were purposely
- 15 withholding relevant information.
- 16 Q. What relevant information do you
- 17 believe that GSK purposely withheld?
- 18 A. That there was a breakdown in IT
- 19 internal controls; that their global
- 20 manufacturing and financial, global financial
- 21 server fleets were unstable.
- 22 Q. When do you believe that there was a
- 23 breakdown in internal controls at GSK?
- 24 A. When do I believe there was a

- 1 They had people with too much authority,
- 2 contractors giving each other authorities.
- 3 There was just a total breakdown of access
- 4 management control.
- 5 Q. What year was this?
- 6 A. I'd say 2011 through when I left.
- 7 O. When -- strike that.
- 8 You described a financial analyst who
- 9 had too much authority. What happened as a
- 10 result of that?
- 11 A. There was a big meeting with a lot of
- 12 people where it was discussed how important
- 13 that was. The financial people and the
- 14 manufacturing people were two different
- 15 groups, but they shared the same server. So,
- 16 if something bad, if one group caused
- 17 something bad to happen, it would affect the
- 18 other. It caused the factory to go down.
- 19 They brought me in to find root cause
- 20 to find out what had happened, and I
- 21 identified that this user had been configured
- 22 with too much authority. And I --
- 0. Okay. And was that fixed?
- 24 A. No.

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1	Q. His authority was not changed?
2	A. His authority was never changed, no.
3	Q. What was his name?
4	A. I don't know.
5	Q. What year was this?
6	A. That was 2013.
7	Q. And you don't know his name?
8	A. I don't have it memorized. I could
9	probably find it out. But I mean, as a
10	result of that, I did an audit of the entire
11	fleet where I found dozens if not hundreds of
12	users across the fleet that had too much
13	authority and I raised that to GSK IT, and
14	they raised a Level 1 audit risk in their
15	risk management system. And they put me in
16	charge of global remediation of that problem.
17	Q. And did you fix it?
18	A. I was not able to fix it.
19	Q. Why not if you were in charge?
20	A. Because I had no support from
21	Jo Taylor. She was retaliating against me,
22	and she gave me no support to do that job.
23	Q. What support did you need that
24	Jo Taylor didn't give you?

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1	Q. And where does a Level 1 risk fall on
2	that scale?
3	A. A Level 1 is the highest. So, if you
4	took a Level 1 which is high but it was not
5	likely to be if the risk was Level 1 but
6	it was not likely that it would be, I don't
7	know what the word is, that it would happen,
8	it would be scored lower. But if it's a
9	Level 1 and there's a high likelihood it
10	would happen, you do the math, and it just
11	produces a bigger number as far as the
12	overall risk.
13	And that's how they score the risks,
14	and that's how they determine what needs to
15	be I guess that's how they determine in
16	what order to address and remediate risk.
17	MS. GRAUMLICH: Why don't we
18	stop for lunch here?
19	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is
20	12:28. Off the video record.
21	
22	(A recess occurred.)
23	
24	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is

- 1 alleges that in May of 2013 a project to
- 2 pursue outsourcing of the service was
- 3 initiated by Taylor, her manager Jeffrey, and
- 4 Miller. And I assume that means Steve
- 5 Jeffrey and Steve Miller. Is that right?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. How do you know who initiated a
- 8 project to outsource the service?
- 9 A. Discussions around the office.
- 10 O. Discussions with whom?
- 11 A. Dan Mong sat right next to me. He
- 12 sat literally like we're sitting right here.
- 13 Q. Okay. But he was a level below you.
- 14 So I'm asking how do you know that the idea
- 15 of outsourcing the service came from Taylor
- 16 and Steve Jeffrey and Steve Miller as opposed
- 17 to someone even higher up in GSK?
- 18 A. My understanding from talking to
- 19 people around the office was that it was an
- 20 idea that Taylor came up with which she sold
- 21 to Jeffrey and Miller.
- 22 Q. Did you ever ask Taylor if it was her
- 23 idea?
- 24 A. No.

- 1 everybody knew, but we all knew that it was
- 2 Taylor. Can I tell you a date or a
- 3 conversation? No, I can't.
- 4 Q. Now, you allege that, and this is
- 5 Paragraph 27, "Taylor excluded Reilly from
- 6 the outsourcing Request for Proposal
- 7 Technical/Business/Financial case
- 8 development, vendor bidding review, and
- 9 vendor due diligence". What do you mean by
- 10 that?
- 11 A. When they were putting out Requests
- 12 for Proposals for the different outsourcing,
- 13 I was not involved in a single meeting over
- 14 the course of nine or ten months. I was the
- 15 system technical subject matter expert of
- 16 everything. I had built the entire fleet.
- 17 And I was not included in a single
- 18 conversation, a single meeting.
- 19 Q. Do you know who was involved in the
- 20 meetings?
- 21 A. Yes. Dan Mong sat right next to me,
- 22 and he was involved in it for nine months.
- 23 O. Who else?
- 24 A. All I know is Dan Mong and Jo Taylor.

- 1 I don't believe even Oberholzer was involved
- 2 in it. I think it was just Dan Mong and
- 3 Taylor, who were the two least technical
- 4 people who were the least qualified to make
- 5 an outsourcing decision, but I certainly
- 6 wasn't involved in it.
- 7 Q. Do you know how Dan Mong became
- 8 involved?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. How?
- 11 A. Steve Miller had a town hall meeting
- in the cafeteria about outsourcing, and Dan
- 13 Mong was very angry and very, very outspoken.
- 14 It stood out because he was talking very
- 15 loudly in front of everybody saying how it's
- 16 a terrible idea, it's not going to save
- 17 money, this and that, how we're efficient,
- 18 how -- and after that meeting, Steve Miller
- 19 came up to his desk, and I was sitting right
- 20 there, and Steve Miller kind of came over and
- 21 talked to him and said, "How would you like
- 22 to get involved". Dan shared that with me.
- 23 And after that, after Dan realized
- 24 that the vice president was approaching him

- 1 and wooing him to be a part of it -- and they
- 2 actually created a job. They decided instead
- 3 of outsourcing everybody but Taylor they were
- 4 going to keep one person. Once Miller came
- 5 up and recruited him, indoctrinated him,
- 6 created a position that would be retained and
- 7 everybody knew he would get it, gave him some
- 8 other lucrative jobs of being like the
- 9 liaison to the leadership team, he was way on
- 10 board. Dan went from being vocally
- 11 outspoken, and I mean that, outspoken at a
- 12 town hall meeting to being completely on
- 13 board.
- 14 And Dan told me right after Miller
- 15 walked away from his office. I heard the
- 16 conversation. And Dan said, "Hey, Steve
- 17 Miller the vice president, biggest guy in the
- 18 building just came up to me", and I think he
- 19 was on board. Dan knew it was a bad idea,
- 20 but he saw a chance to save himself.
- 21 Q. Did you express your feelings about
- 22 outsourcing during that town hall?
- 23 A. No, I didn't.
- Q. Did you have an opinion?

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1	one meeting. I was not allowed to
2	see the Request for Proposal. Never
3	saw anything. I never spoke to
4	anybody at Blue Chip over the course
5	of a year and-a-half.
6	BY MS. GRAUMLICH:
7	Q. Why do you think they didn't involve
8	you?
9	A. Jo Taylor didn't want me involved.
10	Q. Why not?
11	A. Because I might tell them that their
12	performance is bad, that the security is a
13	disaster. She wanted to get rid of me.
14	Q. And if you had told them that the
15	performance was bad and security was a
16	disaster, do you believe that no one would
17	have bid on the outsourcing?
18	A. I think it would have been more
19	expensive than it would have been at least
20	known. I have the feeling that nobody at
21	Blue Chip knew what they were getting. I saw
22	
23	Q. So do you think Jo didn't involve you
24	because she didn't want

- 1 A. Yes, she did.
- 2 Q. -- anyone who would disrupt the plan
- 3 to outsource?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. And the plan was to outsource the
- 6 entire service that you were the technical
- 7 lead on, that Rick Oberholzer worked on, that
- 8 Mike Bacon and Steve Farnden worked on,
- 9 right? So the four of you would definitely
- 10 all lose your jobs, correct, or your jobs
- 11 would be eliminated?
- 12 A. In a normal situation, when people
- 13 outsource, they keep their technical subject
- 14 expertise or at least the most competent. If
- 15 it had been a normal situation and they had
- 16 made a legitimate case for outsourcing, I
- 17 would have been the one to have been retained
- 18 to oversee the service. Jo Taylor was
- 19 retained, and she has never signed onto an
- 20 AS/400. She came from Document Management
- 21 where she wasn't even really in IT.
- In a normal situation, the subject
- 23 matter expert would be consulted, involved
- and probably retained to manage the service

- 1 Q. Well, you just testified that people
- 2 were reporting issues to you that you didn't
- 3 specify. Do you know whether those issues
- 4 were resolved? Do you know whether there's
- 5 still issues with the AS/400?
- 6 A. When I brought it to their attention,
- 7 I was put on immediate administrative leave.
- 8 I tried to bring it to their attention. I
- 9 went -- the day that I returned nobody
- 10 reported it to me. I looked in the database
- 11 to see that Blue Chip was -- the users were
- 12 complaining about performance, and Blue Chip
- 13 was just opening and closing the tickets. A
- 14 plant in Egypt was down. There was all kinds
- 15 of stuff going on, and when I reported it, I
- 16 was put on administrative leave immediately
- 17 and separated from everything. So nobody
- 18 reported anything to me. I was aware of it.
- 19 And when I reported it, they didn't deny it,
- 20 but I was immediately marginalized and
- 21 removed from the situation. So, after that,
- 22 I don't know what happened.
- 23 But the last time I looked Blue Chip
- 24 had only had the system for three or four

- 1 conclusion. That was a fact.
- Q. And after the outsourcing, in
- 3 addition to your position being eliminated,
- 4 was Rick Oberholzer's position eliminated and
- 5 he terminated?
- 6 A. Rick Oberholzer, Mike Bacon and Steve
- 7 Farnden were allowed to apply for the open
- 8 position even though it was a foregone
- 9 conclusion that Mong would get it. Everybody
- 10 knew it. I talked to them about it.
- 11 Everybody knew it. But they were allowed to
- 12 apply for it. I was not allowed to apply for
- 13 the open position.
- Q. Why do you say you were not allowed
- 15 to apply for the position?
- 16 A. Because I was told that with my grade
- 17 the retained position was going to be a very,
- 18 very low-level position and that I was too
- 19 high of a grade to apply for the position.
- Q. Who told you that?
- 21 A. Jo Taylor.
- Q. Was Jo Taylor in the position at that
- 23 time or was Henry Bolton?
- A. Jo Taylor was in place until the end

- 1 of March, and then Bolton came on in the
- 2 beginning of April about around that time.
- 3 Q. And aft- --
- 4 A. He came in second quarter of 2014.
- 5 Q. After Henry Bolton came in to serve
- 6 as manager while Jo Taylor was on adoption
- 7 leave, did Henry Bolton allow you to apply
- 8 for the position that was remaining that you
- 9 said Mong was going to get?
- 10 A. Yes. A window suddenly opened where
- 11 they sprung on me that I was allowed to apply
- 12 for this position, and I had to agree that if
- 13 I wasn't selected for the position I was
- 14 agreeing that I would be let go.
- 15 So the caveat was, here, you have a
- one-week window to apply for something that
- 17 you haven't been involved in for the last ten
- 18 months, but the caveat is if you apply for it
- 19 and you don't get it you're agreeing to be
- 20 let go.
- 21 O. But was that also true for Mike
- 22 Bacon, Steve Farnden and Rick Oberholzer?
- 23 A. That was true for them.
- Q. And did anyone ever tell you that if

- 1 you didn't apply your position would remain?
- 2 A. By this time, I had already escalated
- 3 to Global Compliance three months earlier,
- 4 and it was an entirely different thread
- 5 happening.
- 6 Q. My question was: Did anyone at GSK
- 7 ever tell you that if you didn't apply for
- 8 the position that Dan Mong was eventually
- 9 selected for that your position would still
- 10 remain at GSK despite the outsourcing?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Who told you that?
- 13 A. Michael Woods from Global Compliance
- 14 told me that based on the information I
- 15 escalated to him I would be safequarded. So
- 16 I went with his word that he was looking at
- 17 my very credible allegations and that he was
- 18 going to protect me. And I was under the
- 19 assumption, especially with his visceral
- 20 response to the information I presented to
- 21 him, that he was going to safeguard me and he
- 22 knew that this whole outsourcing was a farce
- 23 to cover up performance and security
- 24 problems.

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1	So I was going on the word of Michael
2	Woods who had instructed me that based on
3	what I showed him I could not be wrongfully
4	terminated for making serious allegations and
5	he was going to protect me. So, in my mind,
6	I was not going to be terminated.
7	Q. Did Michael Woods ever tell you that
8	you couldn't have your position eliminated as
9	a result of an outsourcing because you had
10	made complaints to the company?
11	A. Can you repeat the question?
12	Q. Did Michael Woods ever tell you that
13	GSK couldn't eliminate your position during
14	the outsourcing just because you had made
15	complaints to the company?
16	A. No. Michael Woods told me that he
17	took my allegations seriously, and he covered
18	the safeguarding and told me that I could not
19	be wrongfully terminated. And

- 20 Q. What do you mean he --
- 21 A. -- I had let him know that --
- 22 Q. Excuse me one second. What do you
- 23 mean he covered the safeguarding?
- 24 A. He talked about how --

- 1 Q. By that, do you mean
- 2 anti-retaliation?
- 3 A. Safeguarding in general. The
- 4 retaliation never stopped. I dealt with
- 5 hostility until the day I walked out the
- 6 door.
- 7 The -- I had let him know three
- 8 months earlier when I escalated to Global
- 9 Compliance that this whole sham was going on
- 10 in attempt to eliminate me. And he told --
- 11 he understood what I was saying, and he said
- 12 I could not be terminated if my allegations
- 13 were true and I would be safeguarded.
- Q. When did Michael Woods tell you that?
- 15 A. When I met with him in Upper Merion.
- 16 Q. Okay. And when was that?
- 17 A. It was January or February of 2014.
- 18 Q. And the outsourcing was announced in
- 19 March of 2014, three months later, correct?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. When Michael Woods met with you in
- 22 January of 2014, did he indicate to you that
- 23 he was aware that your team might be
- 24 outsourced?

		Page 175
1	system was not involved in a single	
2	meeting, and it was apparent that	
3	they were he bought into the fact	
4	that the outsourcing was part of the	
5	overall, and he ensured me that I	
6	could not be eliminated if my	
7	allegations were true.	
8	He said it was getting	
9	attention at the highest levels of	
10	the company, including Andrew. He	
11	told me that this could impact share	
12	value if it were found out that we	
13	were withholding information from	
14	PwC. My elimination was talked but	
15	it wasn't talked about granular.	
16	Because everything else I presented	
17	to him was so big that I just think	
18	he had to absorb what I was showing	
19	him, and he knew the ramifications	
20	because he came from Global Internal	
21	Audit. And he was my contact ten	
22	years earlier when we rolled out	
23	Sarb-Ox. He knew exactly what was	
24	going on.	

- 1 A. No. The primary concern was to relay
- 2 extremely serious problems with the global
- 3 manufacturing and enterprise financial
- 4 systems that were impacting GSK around the
- 5 world. That was the primary focus of the
- 6 conversation. It wasn't the --
- 7 Q. So the primary focus --
- 8 A. -- details of outsourcing. It was --
- 9 Q. You were not interested in trying to
- 10 save your job. Is that what you're saying?
- 11 A. I would never say that. My whole, my
- 12 whole purpose of doing this was to save the
- 13 service from having another CiDRA. Because I
- 14 had been through CiDRA. I was a loyal
- 15 employee. I took pride in the system that I
- 16 had built. I was watching it being ruined.
- I was trained on corporate integrity
- 18 agreement, business ethics, corporate
- 19 conduct, Sarb-Ox. I was trained on
- 20 everything. I was a company guy. I was
- 21 trying to protect the company. I wasn't
- 22 trying to just protect myself. I wanted to
- 23 save my job, of course, but I did everything
- 24 that I was trained to do by escalating this.

- 1 A. I was working under the assumption
- 2 that I was going to be protected by Michael
- 3 Woods, so I didn't put a whole lot of thought
- 4 into this. I was living in parallel
- 5 realities. One was Michael Woods was telling
- 6 me I was protected and he was doing an
- 7 investigation, and the other was GSK IT
- 8 telling me that I was going to be eliminated.
- 9 So I was actually in parallel worlds,
- 10 and I could not push back with GSK IT to say,
- 11 "Hey, I'm not going to apply for this because
- 12 I'm going to wait for the Michael Woods
- investigation". I just had to keep my mouth
- 14 shut and just hope that Michael Woods was
- 15 going to come through with his investigation.
- So I was in a difficult, I was put in
- 17 a difficult position by being told one thing
- 18 by Michael Woods and being told something
- 19 else by GSK IT. And --
- 20 Q. Putting aside your complaint to
- 21 Michael Woods, would you have been willing to
- take a downgrade to stay employed at GSK?
- 23 A. I wanted to retain my current
- 24 position to save the service.

- 1 handed you what's been marked as Exhibit-7 to
- 2 your deposition. Do you recognize that
- 3 document?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Did you create it?
- 6 A. Yes, I did.
- 7 Q. Under Wednesday, it says, Number 1,
- 8 "Attended meeting with Henry and Robert
- 9 Koroly to discuss early termination and
- 10 package". What was that meeting about?
- 11 A. I think it was to discuss early
- 12 termination and package.
- 0. What does that mean?
- 14 A. It means to me that Henry and Robert
- 15 Koroly were not aware that Michael Woods was
- 16 doing an active investigation, and I was
- 17 awaiting the outcome. I could not decline
- 18 that meeting and say, "Hey, Henry and Robert,
- 19 I'm not going to attend this meeting because
- 20 Michael Woods from Global Compliance is doing
- 21 an investigation. I'm waiting the outcome.
- 22 He said he'd protect me". I committed to
- 23 Michael Woods that I would not discuss it
- 24 with anybody internally or externally, so I

		Page 201
1	Α.	Yes.
2	Q.	And when did you go out on disability
3	leave?	
4	A.	July 2014.
5	Q.	Do you remember the last day that you
6	worked	?
7	Α.	Do I remember the last day? I don't
8	know i	f I knew it was my last day, so I don't
9		
10	Q.	No, the last day you worked before
11	going	on disability leave. I'm sorry I
12	wasn't	precise.
13	Α.	I don't know. I don't remember that
14	day, n	0.
15		MS. GRAUMLICH: And I'm going
16		to ask the court reporter to mark as
17		Reilly-8 a copy of his Disability
18		Claim Form to be subject to our
19		protective order. I might have given
20		you one too many.
21		MS. JENKINS: Sorry.
22		MS. GRAUMLICH: Reilly-8?
23		THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
24		

- 1 worked?
- 2 A. I mean it was right around that time.
- 3 I don't know the exact day.
- 4 Q. On or about July?
- 5 A. On or about July 1st.
- 6 Q. And after going on disability leave
- 7 in early July 2014, did you ever return to
- 8 the workplace?
- 9 A. No. I returned to work with an
- 10 agreement to work from home until April 2015.
- 11 Q. And when did you return -- strike
- 12 that.
- When did you start working from home?
- 14 A. The first business day of 2015,
- 15 whatever that was.
- 16 Q. And beginning January of 2015, did
- 17 you have any face-to-face contact with Steve
- 18 Oberholzer (sic) or Dan Mong --
- 19 A. No.
- 20 Q. -- or any of the members of your
- 21 team?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q. Did you have any phone calls with any
- of the members of your team?

- 1 I believe was the one that you said.
- 2 October.
- 3 Q. I'm sorry?
- 4 A. I think the final date that you said
- 5 was the date, yes.
- 6 Q. Last day of October 29, 2014.
- 7 A. Sounds right.
- 8 Q. Now, did Michael Woods ever
- 9 substantiate the complaints that you made to
- 10 him?
- 11 A. I never spoke to Michael Woods again.
- 12 Q. You never spoke to him again?
- 13 A. No. He --
- Q. Did you have any e-mails with him?
- 15 A. Actually, that's not true. I spoke
- 16 with him in October from home.
- 17 O. And what did he tell you when you
- 18 spoke with him in October?
- 19 A. He told me that he was going to try
- 20 to get in touch with me in August but didn't
- 21 realize I was on short-term disability, which
- 22 was odd because I had told him on a number of
- 23 occasions that I was working in an extremely
- 24 hostile environment and I was wondering why

- 1 he wasn't protecting me. But not only wasn't
- 2 he protecting me when he said he would, he
- 3 didn't even know I was out of the office.
- 4 Q. Why would you expect Michael Woods to
- 5 know whether you were in the office or not?
- 6 A. If you're telling somebody that
- 7 you're being harassed and you're working in a
- 8 hostile environment, you'd think that they'd
- 9 know if you're in the office or they at least
- 10 know your situation. I would think.
- 11 Q. Why would you think that?
- 12 A. He was safeguarding me. I was
- 13 reporting a hostile environment. Maybe he
- 14 would check in with me to see, "Hey, how is
- 15 that hostile environment". It just seemed
- 16 odd to me that he didn't even know for months
- 17 that I was out of the office. It just seemed
- 18 odd to me. For somebody who was safeguarding
- 19 me and who was being told on a number of
- 20 occasions that the heat was being turned up,
- 21 it just seemed odd to me.
- 22 Q. What did you think safeguarding
- 23 meant?
- 24 A. Everything that GSK policy says.

	Page 208
1	THE COURT REPORTER: Yes?
2	THE WITNESS: Yes.
3	BY MS. GRAUMLICH:
4	Q. When did you communicate with him?
5	A. I sent him a voluminous amount of
б	e-mails January through April or May.
7	Q. When you spoke with Michael Woods in
8	October of 2014, what did you tell him about
9	what strike that.
10	When you spoke with Michael Woods in
11	October of 2014, what did he tell you about
12	the results of his investigation?
13	A. He told me that his investigation
14	ended in April or May. He never told me
15	that.
16	Q. And what did he tell you if anything
17	about what he concluded?
18	A. He wouldn't tell me.
19	Q. He wouldn't tell you whether he
20	substantiated your complaints
21	A. No.
22	Q or not?
23	A. He wouldn't tell me. He said that
24	his investigation ended in April or May,

- 1 which I didn't know. He never told me. He
- 2 told me he wrote up his report in June or
- 3 July, which he never told me. I asked him if
- 4 I could have a copy of the report. He said
- 5 no.
- 6 The thing that struck me as odd was
- 7 he said he, by phone, that he wrote up the
- 8 report in June/July, yet the report that he
- 9 attached to the Reed Smith response to OSHA
- 10 was dated 12 September. So he told me that
- 11 he wrote his report in June/July, yet it was
- 12 dated 12 September. I didn't understand
- 13 that. It sounded kind of fishy to me.
- I just told him that I was just
- 15 surprised I didn't know any of that. He
- 16 never disclosed to me that he had made them
- 17 aware of the investigation, which explained
- 18 why the hostility got worse because he had
- 19 made Miller and Taylor aware. He never told
- 20 me that -- he never told me anything. He
- 21 never protected me. He never contacted me.
- 22 He just didn't -- he, in my -- in the
- 23 rearview mirror if I had to go back and look,
- 24 he was just leading me on to try and run out

- 1 Q. Protect yourself how?
- 2 A. Could have contacted the SEC. Could
- 3 have contacted the FDA. Could have contacted
- 4 the DOJ. I could have contacted the Serious
- 5 Fraud Office. I don't know, I could have
- 6 done what he told me not to do and report it
- 7 to an outside agency. I could have reported
- 8 it to OSHA. He --
- 9 Q. Did Michael Woods tell you not to
- 10 contact the SEC?
- 11 A. He told me not to contact, not to
- 12 share this with anybody internally or
- 13 externally.
- 14 Q. And by that, did you understand that
- 15 you couldn't report to a government agency?
- 16 A. Yes, I took him literally.
- 17 Q. Did you understand that GSK policy
- 18 encourages employees to report wrongdoing to
- 19 government agencies, allows them to report
- 20 it?
- 21 A. I was going by what he told me.
- 22 O. But you were familiar with GSK's
- 23 policies, right?
- 24 A. Now I am.

EXHIBIT 2

Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

- - -

THOMAS REILLY, : NO. 17-2045

Plaintiff, :

VS.

GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC, :

Defendant. :

Thursday, January 10, 2019

DISCOVERY DEPOSITION of DANIEL MONG, taken at
Reed Smith, LLP, Three Logan Square, 1717 Arch
Street, Suite 3100, Conference Room L,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, commencing at 9:35
a.m., before Gina E. Scheetz, Registered Merit
Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, a New Jersey
Certified Court Reporter, a Delaware Certified
Court Reporter, Certified LiveNote Reporter,
Licensed CaseViewNet Realtime Provider, an iCVNet
Certified Reporter and Notary Public.

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1	COUNSEL APPEARED AS FOLLOWS:
2 -	POLLINS LAW
3	BY: SCOTT POLLINS, ESQUIRE BY: TASHELL J. JENKINS, ESQUIRE 303 West Lancaster Avenue
4	Suite 1C
5	Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087 610.896.9909
6	E-mail: scott@pollinslaw.com tashell@pollinslaw.com Representing the Plaintiff
7	Representing the Plaintill
8	REED SMITH, LLP
9	BY: BETTY S. W. GRAUMLICH, ESQUIRE BY: ANNE E. ROLLINS, ESQUIRE
10	Riverfront Plaza - West Tower 901 East Byrd Street Suite 1900
11	Richmond, Virginia 23219-4068 804.344.3456
12	E-mail: bgraumlich@reedsmith.com arollins@reedsmith.com
13	Representing the Defendant
14	
15	ALSO PRESENT:
16	ELIZABETH FEENEY,
17	GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
′	THOMAS REILLY
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

Case 2:17-cv-02045-JCJ Document 39-1 Filed 06/10/19 Page 68 of 116 DANIEL MONG

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12	Stipulations
13	Page Line Page Line Page Line
14	None
15	
16	Question Marked
17	Page Line Page Line Page Line
18	None
19	
20	
21	
22	
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24	

		Page 5
1		
2		DANIEL MONG, having been duly
3	sworn,	was examined as follows:
4		
5		MADAM REPORTER: And the
6	witnes	s will read and sign; correct?
7		MS. GRAUMLICH: Yes.
8	BY MR. POLLIN	S:
9	Q	Please state your full name.
10	А	Daniel Mong.
11	Q	What's your address, Mr. Mong?
12	A	1515 Ivywood Way in Lansdale,
13	PA.	
14	Q	19 the ZIP there?
15	A	19446, yes.
16	Q	We're here today for a
17	deposition.	
18		Have you ever had a deposition
19	taken before?	
20	A	No.
21	Q	If I ask you a question and
22	you don't hea	r my question, please let me
23	know and I'll	repeat the question. Will you
24	agree to do t	hat?

	Page 48
1	friends with him?
2	A No.
3	Q Okay. Do you recall the time
4	that you were the iSeries service analyst,
5	did you have to travel at all for your job?
6	A I went to conferences in
7	Rochester, Minnesota, where the IBM
8	headquarters are.
9	Q Anywhere else?
10	A I did yeah. I traveled to
11	Cidra, Puerto Rico, for business once, and I
12	think that was it. That was the only time I
13	traveled.
14	Q And you said your job was
15	service-oriented; right?
16	A Yes.
17	Q And Mr. Oberholzer's was
18	hardware. What was Tom's focus?
19	A Tom primarily, he helped with
20	the design of the server environment. In
21	order to make it a common platform, he
22	developed what was called a standard build,
23	so Tom did a lot of programming effort to
24	design a standard build that could be

	Page 4	9
1	implemented on each of these servers, which	1
2	it did greatly, you know, simplify the	
3	overall management, so that that was	
4	Tom's role.	
5	Q The AS/400 servers?	
6	A Yes.	
7	Q Which were the computers that	-
8	were being used worldwide at Glaxo?	
9	A Yes.	
10	Q Are they still the same	
11	computers?	
12	A They are, yes.	
13	Q What's ERP?	
14	A It stands for Enterprise	
15	Resource Planning.	
16	Q How does that relate to the	
17	computer system at Glaxo?	
18	A Well, the ERP would be	
19	like, the JD Edwards Financial Service	
20	well, we just referred to it as JD Edwards	
21	and the manufacturing software's called	
22	BPCS, the acronym BPCS.	
23	You know, ERP, that	
24	terminology is really more closely aligned	

Page 107
background, but an understanding of this
framework that's called ITIL. It stands for
Information Technology Infrastructure
Library.
Q I-T-I-L?
A I-T-I-L, yes. And that's a
like a globally or global, you know
it's called a framework for how to manage an
i not an iSeries any computer service,
so it takes all various things into
consideration; incidents, problems, changes,
you know, customer feedback and, you know,
continuous improvement. It's like a whole
thing. So she was very adept in that.
Q How did that qualify her to
become the AS/400 manager?
A I don't know. That decision
wasn't mine, and I don't even remember who
the director was at that time that either Jo
or Brian reported to to make that decision.
I just know that they swapped roles.
Q Are you aware of anyone in the
department saying they felt Jo Taylor was
not qualified to become the manager of

	Page 108
1	AS/400?
2	A Yes.
3	Q You were looking at Tom. So
4	is Tom one of those people?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Did anyone else say that?
7	A I think we all questioned it,
8	honestly.
9	Q Why did you question it?
10	A Uhm, just because. Uhm, yeah,
11	I didn't know much about her. That was it.
12	It was because I didn't have any facts.
13	Q Why was Tom questioning it?
14	A He was I mean, I would be
15	speculating, but, you know
16	MS. GRAUMLICH: I instruct you
17	not to speculate.
18	THE WITNESS: Yeah, um-hmm.
19	BY MR. POLLINS:
20	Q So when I asked you why did
21	Tom question it, I really maybe it's a
22	poor question.
23	But did you talk about it with
24	Tom? Did Tom say, here's why I think Jo

	Page 135
1	umbrella. You know, there was a lot of
2	people that were slated to go at that time.
3	Q Are there any other people
4	that when I asked you or you mentioned that
5	people have lost respect for it sounds
6	like you're telling me people that had lost
7	respect for the team, not necessarily Tom;
8	is that correct?
9	A Yeah. It was a dysfunctional
10	team, so, you know
11	Q Is there anyone else that you
12	haven't told us about yet?
13	A No. I don't recall any other
14	names right now.
15	Q Whose idea was it to outsource
16	the iSeries department?
17	A I don't know if it was Jo's
18	idea, but it was sort of that's who I
19	learned, you know, the idea from first. She
20	mentioned it in a meeting saying that if we
21	are unable to get along and work together
22	that she would have to look at an
23	outsourcing option, and that was at a
24	meeting we had with HR because I call it the

	Page 136
1	Kendall meeting.
2	The woman's name was Kendall.
3	She came in sort of to referee this this
4	meeting and yeah, so that was sort of
5	the the conclusion of that. You know, we
6	need to start working together as a team.
7	Q This was obviously before Jo
8	took her adoption leave; right?
9	A Yeah, um-hmm. Yes.
10	Q So what year was that?
11	A I'd say 2012.
12	Q Kendall was an HR person?
13	A She was an HR rep, yeah.
14	Q Who was in the meeting besides
15	you, Kendall, Jo who else?
16	A And Tom, Rick and Judd.
17	Q So Jo said if we can't get
18	along we're gonna have to outsource?
19	A That was a comment she made
20	towards the end of the meeting, yes. She
21	didn't said we have to outsource. She would
22	have to consider outsourcing. So that's the
23	first time I learned of sort of a tangible,
24	like, action.

EXHIBIT 3

Michael S Woods /CORP 04-Nov-2005 18:19 Global Internal Audit US, RTP, Sth E1450F 703-2264 / +1 919 483 2264

Tom Reilly/IT/GSK@GSK, Dan M Mong/IT/GSK@GSK,

cc Brian M Gillies/CORP/GSK@GSK

bcc

Subject Access Management Audit - AS400 Systems Review

Tom, Dan,

As background for the interviews the week of November 7th, I've outlined the areas GIA is covering and work I need to accomplish that relate to AS400 in this email. To date, I've covered off this work on the Windows areas and my expectation based on that is that we should be able to complete this in the time scheduled for Monday and Tuesday. Thank you for being available for the meetings scheduled on Monday and Tuesday:

Tom - Monday - 9 to 9:45, Tuesday - 10 to 11 Dan - Monday 10 to 12, Tuesday - 3:30 to 4:30

GIA's review is around the access controls portion of the access management processes is in part a Sarbanes readiness review. GIA is performing this work for John Borror and Thierry Ackermann. There will be no formal audit report with audit opinion, but rather there will be a memo with findings and we will track these as with report audit findings. The attached Engagement Memo which covers other details of the audit as well:



Engagement Memo -Access Management.doc .

We are working primarily with IMS under Lynn Lloyd, however included in the work will be some review of configurations of systems with Sarbanes applications running on them and a couple of non-Sarbanes systems to include an understanding of overall processes and controls. The systems selected for review are:

Sarbanes:

JD Edwards (JDE)

International (BPCS,SAP,JDE)

JD Edwards (JDE)

USSBCH01

KOPSA1P1

USSBPH05

Non-Sarbanes:

JD Edwards (JDE)

KOPSJ1P1

Key risk areas GIA is reviewing:

 Policy and Process Alignment - Implemented process does not align to policy, resulting in gaps in assurance testing for policy compliance.

AS400 specific policies and procedures that cover monitoring that I have reviewed include:

ITI_SOP_2341 AS400 Reporting and Monitoring Version 4.0 ITI_STD_2019 AS400 Security Standard Version 2.0

ITI_LIN_4606 Report and Monitoring for AS400

 Authentication and Authorization Process - Insecure authentication or authorization processes controls allow unauthorized access to data

I will review implementation of the Access Management - Management Practice and Password Standards settings, understand overall how the standards and practice are complied with, and for the servers in the sample listed above verify:

Access Management MP sections:

3.1.6 - Strategic Auth mechanism

3.4.1 - Systems Administration over Secure Channel

3.5.1 - Disable after 9 invalid attempts

3.5.5 – Must comply with password standards

Password Standards sections:

(general)

9.1.1 - Min 7 char

9.1.2 - one alpha and one non alpha

9.2.1 - stored secure format

9.2.3 - secure transmission

 Monitoring - Failure to monitor user access can allow inappropriate user access or misuse of privileges to go undetected and corrected

While we will primary addressing this with IMS [A04.05.10 ITI_SOP_2341 AS400 Reporting and Monitoring Version 4.0 and ITI_LIN_4606 Report and Monitoring for AS400], I need to understand any other monitoring that is implemented that might monitor and detect unauthorized access attempts or unauthorized system security changes.

Access to Servers - Inappropriate access to server resources is allowed

Review access control settings on data areas on sample servers are limited to authorized users only. Broadly, understand the overall access management to data areas, who is responsible for granting access, what the process is, and how it is governed. For the sample servers, review access control settings for the files/data objects secured on the systems to assure that controls are in place and reasonably applied.

 Privileged User Accounts - Inappropriate or unauthorized access privileges assigned to users

Identify all privileged accounts and account owners. Determine process for assuring regular accounts are not granted privileged access. For a sample of accounts follow-up to verify approvals and training records.

My apologies for not sending this background on Thursday as I indicated I would; due to staff availability I had to address other matters Thursday and was not able to attend to this. I look forward to speaking with you the week of the 7th.

Regards, Michael

Michael S. Woods Global Internal Audit GlaxoSmithKline

Office: (US - RTP) +1.919.483.2264

Mobile: +1.919.260.3616 Michael.S.Woods@gsk.com

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EXHIBIT 4

Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

- - -

THOMAS REILLY, : NO. 17-2045

Plaintiff, :

vs.

GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC, :

Defendant. :

Friday, January 25, 2019

DISCOVERY DEPOSITION of MICHAEL S. WOODS,
Director, Senior Information Security Consultant,
taken at Reed Smith, LLP, Three Logan Square, 1717
Arch Street, Suite 3100, Conference Room 31C,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, commencing at 9:03
a.m., before Gina E. Scheetz, Registered Merit
Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, a New Jersey
Certified Court Reporter, a Delaware Certified
Court Reporter, Certified LiveNote Reporter,
Licensed CaseViewNet Realtime Provider, an iCVNet
Certified Reporter and Notary Public.

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	Page 2
1	COUNSEL APPEARED AS FOLLOWS:
2 -	POLLINS LAW
	BY: SCOTT POLLINS, ESQUIRE
3	303 West Lancaster Avenue
	Suite 1C
4	Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087
_	610.896.9909
5	E-mail: scott@pollinslaw.com
6	Representing the Plaintiff
7	DEED CMITTU IID
,	REED SMITH, LLP BY: MARK J. PASSERO, ESQUIRE
8	Riverfront Plaza - West Tower
	901 East Byrd Street
9	Suite 1900
	Richmond, Virginia 23219-4068
10	804.344.3423
	E-mail: mpassero@reedsmith.com
11	Representing the Defendant
12	
13	ALSO PRESENT:
14	ELIZABETH FEENEY,
1 -	GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
15	DDECEME DELEDIONICALIA:
16	PRESENT TELEPHONICALLY:
1	THOMAS REILLY
17	
18	
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20	
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24	

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1	I N D E X	
2	WITNESS	PAGE
3	MICHAEL S. WOODS, Director,	
4	Senior Information Security Consul	tant
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5		
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8		
	NUMBER DESCRIPTION	MARKED
9	GSK 67 Document entitled "AS/400	33
10	GSF Americas - Investigation	
11	Report"	
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14	None
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16	Question Marked
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18	None
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	Page 5
1	
2	MICHAEL S. WOODS, DIRECTOR,
3	SENIOR INFORMATION SECURITY
4	CONSULTANT, having been duly sworn,
5	was examined as follows:
6	
7	MADAM REPORTER: Would you
8	like the witness to read and sign?
9	MR. PASSERO: Yes.
10	MADAM REPORTER: Thank you.
11	BY MR. POLLINS:
12	Q Please state your full name.
13	A Michael Stanley woods.
14	Q What's your address, Mr.
15	Woods?
16	A 412 Lafayette Drive,
17	Hillsboro, North Carolina 27278.
18	Q We're here for a deposition.
19	You've had a deposition taken before?
20	A No.
21	Q Okay. So I'm gonna give you
22	some preliminary instructions.
23	If I ask you a question and
24	you don't hear my question, please let me

Is that Sarbanes-Oxley when you say that in your e-mail? MR. PASSERO: Objection. Where are we talking about? MR. POLLINS: If you look at the second paragraph, second line, it talks about a Sarbanes readiness review. Next paragraph talks about Sarbanes applications. The next line, non-Sarbanes systems. Right after that it says Sarbanes, colon, and it has what looks like three servers, JD Edward, International, JD Edwards and then non-Sarbanes. BY MR. POLLINS:
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The next line, non-Sarbanes 11 systems. Right after that it says 12 Sarbanes, colon, and it has what 13 looks like three servers, JD Edward, 14 International, JD Edwards and then 15 non-Sarbanes.
systems. Right after that it says Sarbanes, colon, and it has what looks like three servers, JD Edward, International, JD Edwards and then non-Sarbanes.
Sarbanes, colon, and it has what looks like three servers, JD Edward, International, JD Edwards and then non-Sarbanes.
looks like three servers, JD Edward, International, JD Edwards and then non-Sarbanes.
International, JD Edwards and then non-Sarbanes.
non-Sarbanes.
non sarsanes.
16 BY MR. POLLINS:
Q So when you say the word
18 "Sarbanes," are you talking about
19 Sarbanes-Oxley?
20 A Yes.
Q Okay. And two-thirds of the
22 way down where it says Sarbanes: JD
Edwards, and then USSBCH01, what is that?
24 A That's a server name.

EXHIBIT 5



Transcript of Jo Taylor

Date: January 15, 2019

Case: Reilly -v- Glaxosmithkline, LLC

Planet Depos

Phone: 888.433.3767

Email: transcripts@planetdepos.com

planetdepos.com

HOMAS RE	ILLY	: Case No:
	Plaintiff	: 2:17-CV- : 02045-JCJ
	-v-	:
GLAXOSMIT:	HKLINE, LLC	: :
	Defendant	: :
		•
	Deposit	ion
	of	
	Ms Jo Ta	aylor
	On Tuesday, Janua	ary 15th 2019
	Commencing at	12.35 pm
	Taken a	at:
	Reed Smith	n, LLP
	Broadgate	Tower
	20 Primrose	Street
	London, EC2	2A 2RS
	United Kir	ngdom
Reported !	by: Miss Pamela Her	nley
	- 224768	

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1	
1	APPEARANCES
2	
3	On behalf of the Plaintiff:
4	POLLINS LAW FIRM
5	Suite 1C
6	Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087
7	Telephone: 610 896 9909
8	Email: scott@pollinslaw.com
9	Tashell@pollinslaw.com
10	BY: MR SCOTT M POLLINS
11	MS TASHELL J JENKINS
12	(Via telephone)
13	
14	On behalf of the Defendant:
15	REED SMITH, LLP
16	Riverfront Plaza - West Tower
17	901 East Byrd Street, Suite 1900
18	Richmond, Virginia 23219-4068
19	Telephone: 804 344 3456
20	Email: bgraumlich@reedsmith.com
21	BY: MS BETTY S W GRAUMLICH
22	
23	
24	
25	

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3

1	REED SMITH, LLP
2	Three Logan Square
3	1917 Arch Street, Suite 3100
4	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
5	Telephone: 215 851 8221
6	Email: arollins@reedsmith.com
7	BY: MS ANNE E ROLLINS
8	
9	Court Reporter: Miss Pamela Henley
10	
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1	A. No.					
2	Q. Have you ever had any					
3	communications with a place called the Serious					
4	Fraud Office in the UK?					
5	A. No.					
6	Q. Do you know what the Serious Fraud					
7	Office is?					
8	A. Yes, it is an organizational body					
9	that investigates serious crimes and fraud.					
10	Q. Are you aware of anyone who has					
11	ever worked for you at Glaxo that communicated					
12	with the Serious Fraud Office?					
13	A. No.					
14	Q. When you were the iSeries service					
15	manager did you have direct reports?					
16	A. Yes.					
17	Q. Who were they?					
18	A. Tom, Rick, Dan, Steve, Mike and					
19	Mike Evani (phonetic).					
20	Q. When you say, "Rick" you mean					
21	Rick Oberholzer?					
22	A. Yes.					
23	Q. And when you say, "Dan" you mean					
24	Dan Mong?					
25	A. Yes.					

1	A. No, because I went out on adoption						
2	leave for a period.						
3	Q. Did you ever do a performance						
4	review for Tom Reilly?						
5	A. Yes.						
6	Q. How many?						
7	A. 2.						
8	Q. What years were those?						
9	A. '13 and '14.						
10	Q. Was one better than the other?						
11	A. Yes.						
12	Q. Which one was better?						
13	A. 2013.						
14	Q. Why was 2013 performance for						
15	Tom Reilly better than 2014?						
16	A. Because I had only recently taken						
17	on the team when the performance reviews were due						
18	to be done at the end of the year, and I was still						
19	getting to know the team, and I based my						
20	performance review on feedback from Brian Gillies						
21	and what I had observed in the 3 or 4 months since						
22	I took over.						
23	Q. So why did that mean that one was						
24	better than the other? I am not I do not						
25	understand.						

1	to put the phone on mute and not, like, re-call						
2	back in, is that okay?						
3	MS GRAUMLICH: Yes.						
4	(Off the record at 1.34 pm)						
5	(Recess taken)						
6	(On the record at 1.39 pm)						
7	BY MR POLLINS:						
8	Q. Ms Taylor, have you ever heard of						
9	the term, uncapped processors?						
10	A. Yes.						
11	Q. What does that mean?						
12	A. It means that a system is able to						
13	use all of the resources that it has got.						
14	Q. So what would that mean for an						
15	AS400?						
16	A. It would mean that if a frame has 3						
17	central processing units that any of the LPARs on						
18	that frame could make use of those processors if						
19	they are free and idle.						
20	(Reporter clarification)						
21	Q. What is an LPAR, Ms Taylor?						
22	A. It is a logical partition or carve						
23	up of a system to create a server.						
24	Q. Does that when processors on						
25	this type of system are uncapped does that impact						

1	change how the service was doing. You know, doing
2	knowledge transfer sessions so that the US could
3	support the UK machines, and the UK could support
4	the US machines. We looked at changing the
5	service model so that the team were not on call
6	out every week-end. That, you know, they could
7	move to a 1 in 4 way of being on call.
8	And also, you know, there was an
9	external conference that was running and we would
10	normally only send 1 person to that. But on that
11	occasion I decided to send two in the hope that,
12	you know, spending some, you know, time together,
13	some social time together, as well as, obviously,
14	you know, attending the business conference that
15	might, you know, help build relationships.
16	Q. Okay. Take a look at GSK-10. It
17	is a several page email. Let us take 5 minutes. It
18	will take you a couple of minutes to review that.
19	I have to go to the rest room.
20	MS GRAUMLICH: We need to take a
21	break on this end as well. So what was the number
22	of the exhibit?
23	MR POLLINS: GSK-10.
24	(Exhibit 10 marked for identification)
25	(Off the record at 2.50 pm)

1	(Recess taken)				
2	(On the record at 2.58 pm)				
3	BY MR POLLINS:				
4	Q. Ms Taylor, have you had a chance to				
5	review GSK-10?				
6	A. Yes.				
7	Q. What is that you and Tom are				
8	discussing in these emails?				
9	A. So the subject of the email was				
10	notification of a physical security and data				
11	integrity audit. However, the subject of Tom's				
12	email is around performance issues across multiple				
13	systems that have nothing to do with the Panama				
14	audit.				
15	Q. Why don't they have anything to do				
16	with the Panama audit?				
17	A. Because they are talking about				
18	systems that are not the Panama market.				
19	Q. So it is just a geographical thing				
20	then?				
21	A. Yes, he is talking about so, for				
22	example, 6P9 does not support the Panama market,				
23	it supports Malaysia.				
24	Q. And who is doing this audit?				
25	A. I believe it was the Panama				

1	government tax authority.
2	Q. Is that who Graciela is?
3	A. No, she was the I believe she
4	was a finance manager in Panama.
5	Q. Who worked for Glaxo?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. So the audit was being done by the
8	Panamanian government?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Okay.
11	A. I believe so.
12	Q. Why did you in the first page at
13	the top of the first page why do you mention
14	PwC, which I assume you mean
15	PriceWaterhouseCoopers?
16	A. Yes, so I do not believe I was
17	copied into the full email thread and my
18	assumption was it was an external auditor, and PwC
19	were our external auditors at the time.
20	Q. Okay. And why do you say that you
21	do not want the external auditor,
22	PriceWaterhouseCoopers, picking up any insights
23	that are not part of the current scope?
24	A. So the scope of the audit was very
25	clear on what they were coming in to do, and that

EXHIBIT 6

From: David Chan Sent: 09 March 2012 11:57 To: Brian Gillies Cc: Jo Taylor Subject: AS400 change reviews
Hi Brian, Jo,
Congratulations on your role swap. Sounds like a great development move and a challenging one for both of you taking on such different responsibilities. Good luck from next week and hope it all goes well.
Wrt AS400 Change request , can I just clarify who will be reviewing AS400 changes in future from the team, as current Brian is the Service Owner and therefore carries out the technical review of the changes? As I believe Joisn't yet qualified to review the changes technically, will the service ownership of the components be passed to someone else within the team, or is the plan to make Jo the Service Owner <u>AND</u> add another team member to the components to be the technical reviewer?
Just want to make sure this is covered in your transition, as I don't want to start rejecting changes because of a lack of technical reviewer.
Thanks
Dave

EXHIBIT 7

From: Tom Reilly

Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 1:53 PM

To: Jo Taylor

Subject: Sarbox Audit

Hi Jo, There was a Sarbox audit discussion at yesterday's team meeting that I wanted to follow up on because no one else did. I understand that production Enterprise One Financial and Order Management server KOPSA3P3 is in scope for the Sarbox audit so wanted to bring to your attention some risks which you can disregard if you determine they've been addressed or think they're not of concern. The two other servers sharing that frame, KOPSA3P1 and KOPSA3P2, were delivered in a vacuum years ago as JDE One World servers. Both were built and delivered to the client with no TIPs, Quality Documentation, System/Security Management Utilities, or visibility/turnover to the various support groups like Access Management, Logging and Monitoring, etc. The System and Security Management Utilities were retrofitted later by me because of technical system management problems and support was informally turned over to Data Center Operations. KOPSA3P2 was eventually rebuilt to spec by me during OMARR as an Enterprise One development server and I also delivered, tuned, load balanced, automated production Enterprise One server KOPSA3P3 and assisted NAIT with standardizing application resource security. KOPSA3P1 (as part of OMARR?) was eventually included retrospectively in a Hardware Design Specification and currently serves as the production cost center reporting server but is still very non standard and non compliant. KOPSA3P1 was supposed to be decommissioned so it was decided, against my recommendation, that there was no need to standardize, provide security reports, remediate the risks, or treat it as a financial Sarbox server. Since the decision not to remediate, the role of that server may have, though I'm not sure, been expanded to include data repository for production Enterprise One data although I'm not sure whether it's financial, order management, or both in nature. Access Management still do not provide account provisioning or security administration support on KOPSA3P1 which is provided by the application support team and I still don't believe there's any visibility or monitoring of the security reports which show many violations. I copied some information below and attached three recent security reports from that server which I believe auditors would take exception to if they followed the trail from KOPSA3P3 and started asking questions. I'm not sure what type of turnover you received when you took your new role but KOPSA3P1 is an undocumented and somewhat unsupported server hosting business critical production data which is why I feel obligated to bring it to your attention so that you're not blindsided. This has been a sore subject in the past which was met with hostility and wasn't up for discussion so I hope I'm not exposing myself. My influence over the past few years has been significantly reduced because of office politics and maybe I've been out of the loop too long and these issues have been addressed in PAMS as exceptions w/o my knowledge but I'm trying to be transparent and offer this to you for what it's worth. Tom

User Id	Special	Authorities					
BELTZK01	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
BLENDER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
BLENDOR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
BOUNCER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
CIPWEB	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_ARIBAPD	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_ARIBAPY	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_BLENDOR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_CANPD	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_CANPY	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_CNADPD	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_CNADPY	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_MAPBL	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_MAPPER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_MAPUK	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE

D MATRIX	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JORCTI	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D MATRIXU	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG		*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_MIRROR	*ALLOBJ	*IOSYSCFG		000011	0111010	BLCADI	PEKAICE
D_PRPD	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_PRPY	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_SAVVION	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_SAVVIONU	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D_SHADOW	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
DECRYPTOR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
DPAGINAT	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
D2	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
ENFORCER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
GAURDIAN	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
GILLIB00	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
GUARDIAN	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
IWC9848	*ALLOBJ	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SPLCTL			
JDEPGMR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
JENIFER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
JWM98400	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
KRASTL00A	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
LAKEVIEW	*ALLOBJ	*SAVSYS					
MIMIXOWN	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
MONITOR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
OMNIENT	*ALLOBJ	*JOBCTL	*SPLCTL				
OMWTERRY	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
OWSECURE	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
PASSWORD	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
PERISHER	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
RBTADMIN	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
SECOR	*ALLOBJ	*AUDIT	*IOSYSCFG	*JOBCTL	*SAVSYS	*SECADM	*SERVICE
SHADOW	*ALLOBJ						

EXHIBIT 8

From: Jo Taylor

Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2013 2:22 AM

To: Tom Reilly

Subject: Re: INSPECTION TO PANAMA-SERVERS - STATUS? Monthend

Performance

Hi Tom

Understand but let's keep the focus and scope tight on the audit. We do not want PWC picking up any insights that are not part of the current scope

Do not mention this to graciela. If she does just politely request that its discussed on another day

Thanks

Jo

Sent from my iPhone

On 15 Jan 2013, at 19:06, "Tom Reilly" < Tom.Reilly@gsk.com > wrote:

Jo, I'll be spending time with Graciela on Thursday and know her well enough to be sure the subject of server performance will come up, and for valid reasons, even if out of scope regarding the purpose of her visit. A while back when Latina were consolidating users/workloads on KOPSA1P2 (under my radar) and before shared processors were enabled, I worked with her on an emergency basis to resolve much less severe performance problems which I did successfully. At this point, every processing resource threshold on that server including memory faulting, disk arm utilization, and end user response time are out of range and unacceptable. Non peak performance on KOPSA1P2 can be bad but the December/January month end performance was horrendous, much worse than India Cx, so I'm preparing myself for the subject to be broached during her visit. Tom

```
> Wednesday 2-January @ 13:00
>
> [cid:image018.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
> [cid:image019.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
> [cid:image020.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
>
> Wednesday 2-January @ 17:30
```

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> [cid:image021.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
> [cid:image022.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
> [cid:image023.png@01CDF322.2E07E780]
>
```

From: Jo Taylor

Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 4:08 AM

To: Tom Reilly

Subject: RE: INSPECTION TO PANAMA-SERVERS - STATUS? Monthend

Performance

Tom

I will support you on this but I urge you to talk to your team mates about this further. We also have the option of bringing in IBM who would be able to validate your findings if you feel you lack creditability within the team, although I don't think you actually need that.

I'd like to see some performance graphs over time rather than green screens if possible to demonstrate more easily what you are trying to say.

Dan is on point for bringing learning back from BCO Project on Capacity and Performance, so that we can implement the same service within the AS400 team (not the same tool probably, just the process). If you want I can facilitate a discussion between you and Dan but I do feel you will gain more "friends" by offering to help set up the capability and lead between you a Continuous Service Improvement to resolve these issues. However to start this gather the data graphs, Voice of the Customer feedback to support you.

With regard to the audit, I doubt they will ask any performance questions. As I understand it the scope is on installation, physical security, and Data Integrity/ Protection.

With regard to 6P9, I'll reach out to Mike and Steve to discuss with you your thoughts on the issue, but again have the facts and data (graphs) to support your case.

Thanks for once again bringing this to my attention

Regards

Jo.

>_____

> [cid:image001.png@01CCDAAA.2FC3AC30]

Jo Taylor<mailto:<u>Jo.x.taylor@gsk.com</u>>
AS400, Service Delivery Manager
Enterprise Systems & Technologies
End User & Infrastructure Services

Internal: 807-1556

External: +44(0) 208 047-1556

Mobile: 07825 116148 Office: CS4/125, GSKH, UK

From: Tom Reilly

Sent: 16 August 2012 20:50

To: Jo Taylor

Subject: RE: INSPECTION TO PANAMA-SERVERS - STATUS? Monthend

Performance

Hi Jo, In light of Graciela's upcoming Panama inspection/audit visit to the GDC, I feel obligated to bring Latina month end performance to your attention again. I know we've discussed this and you prefer to wait until they raise it as an issue but it would be awkward and generate negative visibility if raised during their visit and the below were to jump off the screen. I won't be here during their visit but know Graciela personally so believe the issue will be raised and wouldn't be surprised if the visit weren't in some way related to poor performance. The Latina servers experienced performance problems last year during their JDE consolidation, because workload was being added under the radar, but they sat on the issue for some time before reporting it to us. I was able at the time to retune the server and solve the problems once they were brought to my attention but can no longer do the same because both performance strategy and my influence changed direction suddenly.

Similar performance issues are surfacing on other servers in the fleet but different people with different levels of understanding and expertise get involved so it's unclear who owns performance and seems our approach it inconsistent.

That's the case on US1SA6P9 where I thoroughly disagree with the action taken and the response sent to Julie but then again I see things that others don't. The action appears to have been done to address the symptoms but in my opinion are actually going to make the problems worse. I also heard that E1/OMARR users are again reporting performance problems which will make my CHNA ERP integration involvement awkward because I disagree with our basic performance strategy and will only be able to offer a finger in the wind. It may be time to identify a performance subject matter expert within the team (doesn't have to be me) to own performance including CHNA ERP and to set direction so we at least have a consistent approach.

I can offer more background on this if you'd like to discuss but I understand my opinion is not necessarily shared by others so would like to avoid a defensive group discussion or be viewed as a non flexible thinker. My opinion may be in the minority but that doesn't necessarily make it wrong. I've been tuning servers for 25+ years and was the subject matter expert within GSK for years who tuned almost exclusively. If my credibility on the subject is in question or I can't influence basic performance strategy, I'd prefer not to be involved in or held accountable for the success of something like CHNA ERP integration which is so mission critical but in my opinion being approached in a way that's unpredictable and unsustainable. Hope I didn't say too much by expressing my views but feel it's necessary to express my opinion since I'm usually the first one approached regarding performance but find myself biting my tongue so as not to rekindle controversies of the past. Tom

KOPSA1P2 month end performance print screens below: For background purposes, 99% of end users on a well tuned server should have sub second response time (Avg Rsp) each time they press Enter (Tns Count)...

EXHIBIT 9

From: Tom Reilly

Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 7:28 AM

To: Jo Taylor

Subject: RE: AAR Review - JDE Performance Issues

Jo, I feel the need to share my opinion on this After Action Review before today's TC even if it's controversial. I'd said for months and as late as mid January, weeks before this incident and escalation began, that KOPSA3P3 was I/O unstable due to uncapped processors but over resourced to compensate. Although I wasn't aware of or asked to participate in the Canada JDE to E1 migration, I did raise concerns at the same time that members of our team were being asked in general to do things for which they were unqualified although we agreed to disagree. NAPIT assumed because of past E1 performance tuning and load testing that we would do a performance/capacity analysis during this effort and make detailed recommendations to avoid such an incident. The people from our team assigned to participate in this effort didn't take capacity and/or performance into consideration and instead treated the effort more as a simple save/restore exercise. After the escalation began, Al Washco requested of Angela that I be part of the SWAT team because of my experience with the initial delivery of E1 and later migration of OMARR. I went to Franklin Plaza to participate in the SWAT team as the EIS performance SME but my recommendations were initially redirected and misinformation was distributed to you and EIS leadership. I was supposed to be in charge at FP of the remediation from an AS400 Server Operations standpoint and my reputation was at stake with NAPIP but I was reprimanded instead for pointing out the exclusion of my opinion and misinformation in the daily update. My analysis, recommendations, and procedures eventually stabilized the service although others, including those who actually contributed to the problems, shared credit for the remediation. In my opinion, if I'd been involved in the Canada JDE migration, the incident/escalation would have been prevented and, if problems had arisen, the remediation would have gone smoothly if my subject matter expertise and opinion were valued. The lack of communications between our team and extremely undisciplined actions during the remediation caused things to happen which put the entire recovery

effort at risk. NAPIT and the EIS BP engaged AS400 server operations on this combined E1 software upgrade and Canada JDE migration effort as they should so in my opinion did their job and did not contribute to the incident. If we don't learn a lesson from this, there's a risk that the same will happen with upcoming BPCS and JDE migrations. Tom

----Original Appointment----

From: Angela Tokarski

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2013 9:53 AM

To: Angela Tokarski; Jo Taylor; Tom Reilly; Al Washco; Amit Joshi; William

O'Shea

Subject: AAR Review - JDE Performance Issues

When: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:00 AM-11:00 AM (GMT-05:00) Eastern

Time (US & Canada). **Where:** Live Meeting

When: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:00 AM-11:00 AM (UTC-05:00)

Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: Live Meeting

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.


Rescheduling due to unavailability of key members of the swat team.

All,

I agreed to create an After Action Review as an outcome from the Swat team established to remediate performance issues encountered post implementation of the JDE/E1 project.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss and document lessons learned.

Angela



Angela Tokarski has invited you to attend an online meeting using ${\tt Microsoft} \\ {\tt R}$ Office Live Meeting service.